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Not long after beginning law school, law students learn the hierarchy of judicial opinions 
and how to perform the triage necessary to efficient understanding of the state of the law.1 
There’s the gold standard: the law-making majority opinion. Those interested in reading for 
comprehension wisely also read dissenting opinions, which always put the majority’s reasoning 
to the test and sometimes point out apparently material facts glossed over by the majority. Lower 
down the pragmatic student’s hierarchy of opinions is the concurring opinion (although there are 
exceptions2) and its cousin, the opinion concurring in the judgment.3 There is even the occasional 
“Statement” filed, in which a Justice does not address the merits of the legal arguments of the 
majority opinion, but instead makes a point regarding something such as the case’s procedural 
posture.4 
These possibilities are familiar to the regular reader of judicial opinions; indeed, it would 
seem that they exhaust the options. However, an alternative exists. In 1964, the Supreme Court 
decided a famous package of legislative apportionment cases challenging the apportionments of 
the State Legislatures of Alabama,5 New York,6 Maryland,7 Virginia,8 Delaware,9 and 
                                                 
1 Note that this discussion does not mention another alternative: the hoary seriatim opinion. E.g., Chisholm v. 
Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 469 (1793) (Jay, C.J.), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. 
XI, as recognized in Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798), and recognized as wrongly decided, 
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
2 See, e.g., Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1368 (2008) (“Justice Jackson's familiar tripartite scheme provides 
the accepted framework for evaluating executive action in this area.” (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring))). 
3 When these truly matter, it often takes a legal academic to mediate between the Court and the legal profession at 
large to make sense of them anyway. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). It is 
entirely possible this opinion is still not fully understood 16 years later. 
4 See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (Souter, J.) (arguing that certiorari had been 
improvidently granted). 
5 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
6 WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964). 
7 Md. Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964). 
8 Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964). 
9 Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964). 
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Colorado.10 The upshot of these decisions11 was that state legislatures must be apportioned 
entirely on a population basis.12 All six of these cases had a separate majority opinion written by 
Chief Justice Warren. Justice Harlan filed a single dissenting opinion that applied to all six.13 
Justice Stewart filed his own dissenting opinion, applying to two of the cases.14 But, in the other 
four cases, Justice Stewart filed the rare opinion styled as nothing at all: merely his name, 
followed by some text.15 They were quite short: no more than 2 paragraphs, each noting that he 
voted as he did for the reasons stated in his dissenting opinion, notwithstanding the fact that his 
dissenting opinion only discussed the two cases he dissented in. Curiously, one of them was a 
dissent, even though it wasn’t styled as one!16 
Since Justice Stewart did not say so directly, it is only in comparing the cases in which he 
chose to dissent and those he did not that we can see what it is that he was getting at, what his 
                                                 
10 Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964). 
11 Several more cases from other States were decided via memorandum opinion a few days later which further made 
the point clear. See Hill v. Davis, 378 U.S. 565 (mem.) (1964), aff’g Davis v. Synhorst, 225 F. Supp. 689 (S.D. Iowa 
1964), and 217 F. Supp. 492 (S.D. Iowa 1963); Pinney v. Butterworth, 378 U.S. 564 (mem.), aff’g Butterworth v. 
Dempsey, 229 F. Supp. 754 (D. Conn. 1964); Hearne v. Smylie, 378 U.S. 563 (mem.), rev’g 225 F. Supp. 645 (D. 
Idaho 1964); Marshall v. Hare, 378 U.S. 561 (mem.), rev’g 227 F. Supp. 989 (E.D. Mich. 1964); Germano v. 
Kerner, 378 U.S. 559 (1964) (mem.), rev’g 220 F. Supp. 230 (N.D. Ill. 1963); Williams v. Moss, 378 U.S. 558 
(1964) (mem.), aff’g Moss v. Burkhart, 220 F. Supp. 149 (W.D. Okla. 1963); Nolan v. Rhodes, 378 U.S. 556 (1964) 
(mem.), rev’g 218 F. Supp. 953 (S.D. Ohio 1963); Meyers v. Thigpen, 378 U.S. 554 (1964) (mem.), aff’g 211 F. 
Supp. 826 (W.D. Wash. 1962); Swann v. Adams, 378 U.S. 553 (1964) (mem.), rev’g Sobel v. Adams, 214 F. Supp. 
811 (S.D. Fla. 1963). 
12 This is a generalization. The courts have tolerated more deviation in state legislative apportionment than 
congressional apportionment, notwithstanding that both are to be apportioned on a population basis. Compare 
Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983) (establishing a rule of very strict population equality between districts 
within a state by invalidating a New Jersey congressional apportionment plan where a perfectly average-sized 
district size was 526,059 and the difference between the largest and smallest districts was 3,674 when competing 
plans existed with a maximum deviation of only 2,375), with Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973) (distinguishing 
between the Equal Protection Clause’s command of equal population in state legislative districting and Article I’s 
requirement that Representatives be elected by “the People” to uphold a Virginia state legislative apportionment 
with a maximum percentage deviation from the ideal district size of 16.4%). 
13 Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 589 & n.* (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
14 Lucas, 377 U.S. at 744 & n.* (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
15 Roman, 377 U.S. at 712 (Stewart, J.); Davis, 377 U.S. at 693 (Stewart, J.); Tawes, 377 U.S. at 676 (Stewart, J.); 
Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 588 (Stewart, J.). 
16 Tawes, 377 U.S. at 677 (Stewart, J.) (in case reversing the Maryland Court of Appeals, “I would vacate the 
judgment and remand the case to the state court for full consideration” of whether the Maryland apportionment 
method was arbitrary or capricious) (emphases added). 
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“reasons” were for voting one way or the other. I argue in this essay that the majority opinions 
silently took for granted tenets of a pluralist theory of politics and representation. Justice 
Harlan’s blanket dissent took the position that, as a matter of separation of powers, the judiciary 
ought to stay out of all legislative districting disputes. It is my argument here that Justice 
Stewart’s pattern of votes attempts to argue for a “third way” approach to these disputes, keeping 
the courts neutral on the issue of which political theory to choose, but insisting that some theory 
be in place. 
This article proceeds in four parts. First, it will briefly discuss some of the terminology it 
uses, explicating the meaning of “pluralism” and discussing the chief theoretical alternative, 
“republicanism.” Then, it will discuss the majority opinions authored by Chief Justice Warren 
and how they appear to have been driven by an acceptance of pluralistic assumptions about 
political processes. After that, it compares Justice Stewart’s treatment of the six cases to 
demonstrate his pattern of voting with the majority in those cases where there was no theory 
being applied, and against the majority when there apparently was. Finally, it will discuss some 
ramifications of this distinction. 
I. Pluralism vs. Republicanism 
It is especially difficult to precisely define theories of politics and representation, due to 
the amount of possible gradation in related approaches. Since this is not a piece of political 
science scholarship, it does not purport to represent the cutting edge of precise distinctions; it is, 
instead, filled with generalizations that may make true political scientists cringe. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has evinced its own hesitancy to attempt to define with 
precision the meaning of political theories, notwithstanding that the Constitution specifically 
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guarantees the States a particular theory of governmental organization.17 Less than twenty years 
before the State legislative apportionment cases were decided, the Court had reaffirmed its 
discomfort with providing content to the constitutional guarantee of republican government, 
declaring that “[v]iolation of the great guaranty of a republican form of government in States 
cannot be challenged in the courts,”18 and earlier in the century it had specifically refused to 
entertain a challenge to a State referendum on Guaranty Clause grounds.19 Even in the Reynolds 
package of cases, where the Supreme Court had indicated its willingness to substantively 
adjudge the propriety of state legislative apportionments, the majority did not so much as cite the 
Court’s prior cases expressing the Court’s discomfort with defining exactly what constituted 
“republicanism.” It seems clear enough that this is a hot potato the Court is uncomfortable 
dealing with. In part, this is probably because one risks privileging one side or the other of the 
debate, and of indicating their own point of view on the matter, almost from the very act of 
attempting to express the concepts in words. 
It seems safe to say that “pluralism” can be fairly described as “interest-group politics.” 
For example, the theory is described by one critic as follows: 
Under th[e pluralistic] view, politics consists of a struggle among interest groups 
for scarce social resources. Laws are a kind of commodity, subject to the forces of 
supply and demand. Various groups in society compete for loyalty and support 
from citizens. Once they are organized and aligned, they exert pressure on 
political representatives, who respond, in a market-like manner, to the pressures 
thus exerted. The ultimate result is political equilibrium. 
                                                 
17 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form 
of Government . . . .”); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42 (1849) (“For as the United States guarantee to each 
State a republican government, Congress must necessarily decide what government is established in the State before 
it can determine whether it is republican or not. And when the senators and representatives of a State are admitted 
into the councils of the Union, the authority of the government under which they are appointed, as well as its 
republican character, is recognized by the proper constitutional authority. And its decision is binding on every other 
department of the government, and could not be questioned in a judicial tribunal.”). 
18 Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 557 (1946). 
19 Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912). 
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 The pluralist approach takes the existing distribution of wealth, existing 
background entitlements, and existing preferences as exogenous variables. All of 
these form a kind of prepolitical backdrop for pluralist struggle. The goal of the 
system is to ensure that the various inputs are reflected accurately in legislation; 
the system is therefore one of aggregating citizen preferences. This understanding 
carries with it a particular conception of representation, in which officials respond 
to constituent desires and exercise little or no independent judgment.20 
 
Notwithstanding that this description was written by a critic of pluralism, the pluralism supporter 
in the same Symposium,21 in criticizing the arguments offered by supporters of republican 
theories of government, notes that 
[a]s a descriptive matter, there is abundant evidence that all too often politics is 
just the way the pluralists describe it: ceaseless compromises between competing 
factions, none of which would pay a nickel to advance the common good, even if 
they could identify it. It does not take an elaborate empirical study to note the 
powerful influence that individual self-interest exerts over politics.22 
 
It would seem, then, that Sunstein’s description of pluralism is fair to the concept. At any rate, 
for the purposes of this article it is understood to mean something like, “people have differences 
over what is right and wrong, or good and bad; government action will inevitably satisfy some 
and dissatisfy others, so the best way to promote social harmony is to allow interest groups to 
fairly compete for legislative victory and, in so doing, compromise their way to welfare-
maximizing outcomes.” 
It seems fair to say that this theory of politics is the dominant one in America today. 
Although this article does not attempt an actual survey of teaching materials used in elementary 
or secondary education, it certainly “sounds” like the sort of explanation of how a legislature 
works that appear in civics textbooks. It seems like the most natural alternative to the 
aristocratic, monarchical form of government that the American colonies rejected in declaring 
                                                 
20 Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1542–43 (1988) (citations omitted). 
21 Symposium, The Republican Civic Tradition, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988). 
22 Richard A. Epstein, Modern Republicanism—Or the Flight from Substance, 97 YALE L.J. 1633, 1637 (1988). 
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their independence: we believe in the wisdom of the crowd, instead of someone who purportedly 
“knows better than us” telling us what is good or bad, and what ought to be the law or not. 
Elements of it even seem to have been expressly embraced by members of the Supreme Court.23 
This, however, is where the republican alternative raises its head. If it is difficult to define 
pluralism, it is even more difficult to precisely define republicanism (as the Supreme Court’s 
hesitancy to dive into the concept discussed above should indicate).24 For these purposes, it is as 
much as anything a criticism of pluralism. For example, Madison advocated the delegation of 
governmental power to a select group of citizens, because it would 
refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a 
chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their 
country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it 
to temporary or partial considerations. Under such a regulation, it may well 
happen that the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will 
be more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the people 
themselves, convened for the purpose.25 
 
Contemporary proponents of republican theories of government are particularly interested in 
Madison’s notion of “refin[ing] and enlarg[ing]” the public’s understanding of public policy. For 
example, one proponent of republicanism emphasizes its view that “[t]he function of politics . . . 
is not simply to implement existing private preferences. Political actors are not supposed to come 
to the process with preselected interests that operate as exogenous variables. The purpose of 
politics is not to aggregate private preferences, or to achieve an equilibrium among contending 
social forces.”26 Instead, it emphasizes a deliberative process that “is designed to produce 
                                                 
23 See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 274, 305 (2003) (plurality opinion) (“Political gerrymanders are not 
new to the American scene. . . . We[, the plurality,] conclude that . . . [the Constitution does not] provide[] a 
judicially enforceable limit on the political considerations that the States and Congress may take into account when 
districting.”). 
24 See Sunstein, supra note 20, at 1547 (“Republican conceptions of politics diverge substantially from one another; 
there is no unitary approach that can be described as republican.”). 
25 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 50 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., Mentor Printing 1999). 
26 Sunstein, supra note 20, at 1548. 
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substantively correct outcomes.”27 Another critic of pluralism (and proponent of republicanism) 
criticizes pluralism’s 
deep mistrust of people’s capacities to communicate persuasively to one another 
their diverse normative experiences . . . . Pluralism . . . doubts or denies our 
ability to communicate such material in ways that move each other’s views on 
disputed normative issues towards felt . . . consensus . . . . It follows that in pure 
pluralist vision, good politics does not essentially involve the direction of reason 
and argument towards any common, ideal, or self-transcendent end. For true 
pluralists, good politics can only be a market-like medium through which 
variously interested and motivated individuals and groups seek to maximize their 
own particular preferences.28 
 
This sort of rhetoric is jarring to the ear of most contemporary people who are politically 
aware. It smacks of the sort of aristocratic, let-your-betters-think-for-you theory of politics that 
the American colonies apparently rejected when they went to war against the King. In particular, 
the notion that there is a “substantively correct outcome” and that people can be “persuaded” to 
think differently sounds extraordinarily paternalistic. It sounds naïve (to be generous) to suggest 
that debates about abortion, or gay marriage, could be resolved if the best and brightest got 
together, talked it out, and came to some inevitable “right” answer. Indeed, republicanism might 
even sound dangerous: “[t]he most objectionable exercises of governmental power are often 
associated with approaches that see character formation as an end of politics.”29 Pluralism is a 
comforting alternative because it “respect[s] current preferences,” “desire[s] to avoid the risks of 
tyranny that are associated with active and self-conscious preference-shaping by public 
officials,” and “is committed to familiar conceptions of majority rule and to a healthy revulsion 
to regimes that take citizen preferences as an object of collective control.”30 
                                                 
27 Id. at 1554 (emphasis added). 
28 Frank Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1507–08 (1988). 
29 Sunstein, supra note 20, at 1543. 
30 Id. (citation omitted). 
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Somewhat less jarring might be the republican emphasis on “political equality,” at least at 
first glance. In this context, republican theory sees equality as “a requirement that all individuals 
and groups have access to the political process; large disparities in political influence are 
disfavored.”31 At first glance, this seems appealing to the contemporary thinker: everyone 
deserves to have their “voice” heard. At the same time, further thought makes it somewhat 
discomfiting: some approaches to giving groups equal access to the political process may 
produce unfamiliar results. For example, many State election codes have provisions for 
identifying those political parties with sufficient popular support that we might say they are 
“legitimate,” or deserving of recognition via the election process32; would anybody support 
giving each such party an equal number of seats in the legislature, so that all points of view have 
equal access to the decision-making process? Yet, if republican theory emphasizes that there is a 
“right” answer, and that the input of differing viewpoints has per se value, this might not offend 
it; the views of the Libertarian Party may be as helpful to the search for truth as the views of the 
Democratic Party, so why not give it an equal seat at the table? 
Which of these is the superior theory is not the point of this paper. The point is simply 
this: there are legitimate competing alternatives. We may find that we prefer one, or the other, or 
combinations of them both. Whether any particular governmental form can definitely be defined 
as one or the other is immaterial; the preceding discussion of their differences should leave us 
suitably respectful of the difficulty of locating each theory’s edges. Moreover, it can be easy to 
forget that there is a relatively developed set of theories and opinions regarding a system of 
                                                 
31 Id. 
32 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 168.16 (West 2004) (“‘[M]ajor political party’ means each of the 2 political 
parties whose candidate for the office of secretary of state received the highest and second highest number of votes 
at the immediately preceding general election in which a secretary of state was elected.”); id. § 168.532 (“A political 
party whose principal candidate received less than 5% of the total vote cast for all candidates for the office of 




government that tends to assume that there are “right” answers to society’s problems that can be 
arrived at through considered deliberation amongst representatives of society’s various 
viewpoints, instead of the tacit presumption that political society exists to allow the majority to 
have its way in such a fashion that the minority is not unduly persecuted (an easy assumption to 
make given the basic pluralistic model employed in the U.S.). 
II. Chief Justice Warren, the Pluralist 
The immense popularity of direct democracy33 could be interpreted as a sign that, even 
without the Reynolds package of cases, Americans have essentially embraced a pluralistic view 
of politics. On the other hand, it is entirely possible that the package of state legislative 
reapportionment cases, and indeed the equipopulation reapportionment cases from that era 
generally,34 have contributed to the contemporary acceptance of pluralism as the default set of 
assumptions and incentives behind political society. Therefore, it is important to locate the 
pluralist assumptions extant in the opinions. 
In the Reynolds package of cases, the majority that Chief Justice Warren spoke for 
asserted that it was merely construing the 14th Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.35 Justice 
Stewart disagreed. 
What the Court has done is to convert a particular political philosophy into a 
constitutional rule, binding upon each of the 50 States, from Maine to Hawaii, 
from Alaska to Texas, without regard and without respect for the many 
individualized and differentiated characteristics of each State, characteristics 
stemming from each State's distinct history, distinct geography, distinct 
distribution of population, and distinct political heritage. My own understanding 
of the various theories of representative government is that no one theory has ever 
                                                 
33 See, e.g.,Marvin Krislov & Daniel M. Katz, Taking State Constitutions Seriously, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
295, 301 (2008) (“Virtually every single American state features some form of direct democracy.”). 
34 More than just state legislative districting was being litigated at the time. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 
(1964) (U.S. House of Representatives districting); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963) (“county unit system” in 
electing party nominees). 
35 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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commanded unanimous assent among political scientists, historians, or others 
who have considered the problem. But even if it were thought that the rule 
announced today by the Court is, as a matter of political theory, the most desirable 
general rule which can be devised as a basis for the make-up of the representative 
assembly of a typical State, I could not join in the fabrication of a constitutional 
mandate which imports and forever freezes one theory of political thought into 
our Constitution, and forever denies to every State any opportunity for 
enlightened and progressive innovation in the design of its democratic 
institutions, so as to accommodate within a system of representative government 
the interests and aspirations of diverse groups of people, without subjecting any 
group or class to absolute domination by a geographically concentrated or highly 
organized majority.36 
 
The majority opinion in Lucas did not address any of Justice Stewart’s criticisms in dissent; nor 
did the majority opinion in WMCA, to which Stewart’s dissent also applied. To the extent that the 
majority addressed the concerns about political theory at all, they simply asserted that 
apportioning seats . . . cannot be sustained by recourse to the so-called federal 
analogy. Nor can any other inequitable state legislative apportionment scheme be 
justified on such an asserted basis. This does not necessarily mean that such a 
plan is irrational or involves something other than a ‘republican form of 
government.’ We conclude simply that such a plan is impermissible for the States 
under the Equal Protection Clause, since perforce resulting, in virtually every 
case, in submergence of the equal-population principle in at least one house of a 
state legislature.37 
 
Either Chief Justice Warren’s majority opinion was exhibiting the height of judicial arrogance, or 
else it simply did not perceive the theoretical import of its action. The best conclusion is the 
latter: Warren simply took for granted, uncritically, certain pluralistic assumptions about political 
society, making the cases seem easy. 
Arguably the boldest evidence that the Court majority tacitly accepted pluralist political 
theories is in arguably its most famous (or at least most poetic) line from any of the six cases. 
“Legislators represent people, not trees or acres. Legislators are elected by voters, not farms or 
                                                 
36 Lucas, 377 U.S. at 748–49 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
37 Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 575. 
11 
 
cities or economic interests.”38 This certainly seems to express distrust of a notion that there is a 
“right” answer to social problems that can be reached if every perspective is accounted for (even 
if that requires amplifying some perspectives in order that they be heard). The next sentence of 
the opinion, which is perhaps less famous, expresses the Court’s assumptions even more clearly: 
“As long as ours is a representative form of government, and our legislatures are those 
instruments of government elected directly by and directly representative of the people, the right 
to elect legislators in a free and unimpaired fashion is a bedrock of our political system.”39 The 
Court offered no further elaboration on this point, perhaps indicating that it considered it 
uncontroversial. A conclusion, however, that our legislators are “directly representative of the 
people” would seem to clash with Madison’s argument that representatives ought to “refine and 
enlarge” the attitudes and opinions of the public, and not merely respond to them. Indeed, the 
political structure may itself have pedagogical value beyond what the legislators learn from each 
other and communicate to their constituents; in being forced to accommodate disparate interests 
and work through a sometimes frustrating legislative process, the system arguably provides for 
imposed humility on those individuals and policy preferences that “deserve” to be in power.40 
Again, later in the opinion the Court asserts that, “[s]ince legislatures are responsible for 
enacting laws by which all citizens are to be governed, they should be bodies which are 
collectively responsive to the popular will.”41 The Court that says such a thing seems to disagree 
with Madison’s argument “that the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the 
people, will be more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the people themselves.” 
                                                 
38 Id. at 562. 
39 Id. (emphasis added). 
40 Cf. Glen Staszewski, Rejecting the Myth of Popular Sovereignty and Applying an Agency Model to Direct 
Democracy, 56 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401–03 & nn.23–25 & 27 (2003) (discussing the Founders’ concerns about 
majority faction and the importance of “deliberative” (as opposed to direct) democracy). 
41 Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 565 (emphasis added). 
12 
 
Similarly, the majority declares that “the basic principle of representative government remains, 
and must remain, unchanged—the weight of a citizen's vote cannot be made to depend on where 
he lives. Population is, of necessity, the starting point for consideration and the controlling 
criterion for judgment in legislative apportionment controversies.”42 While this may or may not 
be true, it was surely not the opinion of Madison, who asked, “Why may not illicit combinations 
. . . be formed as well by a majority of a State, especially a small State as by a majority of a 
county, or a district of the same State?”43 The attitude exuded by the court majority seems to be: 
“who is to say what’s an ‘illicit majority,’ Mr. Madison?” 
As a consequence of this discussion of the Court’s theoretical acceptance of pluralist 
political assumptions, it should come as no surprise that the Court fixated on statistical 
population deviations. In fact, the majority cited, in all six of these reapportionment cases, the 
maximum population deviation between the smallest and largest districts, and the smallest 
number of districts representing a majority of the State’s population.44 Although this certainly 
provided for easier, more administrable rules of law for the lower courts to administer, it also 
cast the debate as whether the more populous portions of a State (i.e., the city) got a voice in 
proportion to their size vis-à-vis the less-populous portions of a State (i.e., rural areas). 
The Court’s distrust of representation by political unit is fully consonant with the 
pluralistic approach to political theory that assumes political groups will seize those public 
resources they can while they are in power. If Democrats do what is right for Democrats, or 
blacks do what is right for blacks, or rural areas do what is right for rural areas when they are in 
power, it makes sense that the Legislature should be designed in order to maximize the 
                                                 
42 Id. at 567 (emphasis added). 
43 THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 244 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., Mentor Printing 1999). 
44 Lucas, 377 U.S. at 725–27; Roman, 377 U.S. at 704–05; Davis, 377 U.S. at 687–689; Tawes, 377 U.S. at 665–67; 
WMCA, Inc., 377 U.S. at 647–48; Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 545–46. 
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preferences of the most people. Although if this were the theory standing alone, it would run 
afoul of the problem of “majority faction” feared by the Founders,45 committed American 
pluralists can rightly point to our Bill of Rights as the “safety net” that allows for governance by 
“majority faction” as a matter of course while preventing majority tyranny. Thus, the majority’s 
comfort with pluralistic forms of governance is understandable, whether or not one agrees with 
their conclusions or reasoning. 
Perhaps the strongest evidence of the Court’s embrace of a particular theory of 
representational structures can be found not in its own opinion, but in the comments of its 
supporters. For example, one extremely laudatory account of the reapportionment cases had this 
to say about the significance of the Court’s decisions: 
John Marshall’s centrist federalism is still atop the heap [after the 
reapportionment cases]; states rights remains mostly a myth. It may be true, as 
Chief Justice Warren once suggested, that the reapportionment cases returned a 
certain amount of viability to state legislatures. But it was still done by repeated 
trips through the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution. Each trip 
cost a bit of the myth; by the time the reapportionment revolution was ended, one 
could see little of value left in a state constitution that could not be handled in 
statutory law. The form of state government was largely established by court 
construction of the federal Constitution; election rules were set there; the 
Fourteenth had activated for all the states almost every clause of the American 
Bill of Rights. So what was left of states rights? 
I do not deplore the loss. Most American citizens had not the slightest 
notion that before this Fourteenth Amendment revolution began, the Bill of Rights 
was not necessarily a shield they could count on. At the same time, most of the 
public commotion over Reynolds, I fancy, sprang from the mistaken notion of 
many individuals that their own state legislatures were somehow properly 
structured after a model they had come to respect—the United States Congress.46 
 
Ironically, the emphasized passages indicate exactly the sort of paternalism that the Court was 
suspicious of in disallowing “over-representation” of “under-populated” areas. 
                                                 
45 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). 
46 GENE GRAHAM, ONE MAN, ONE VOTE 292–93 (1972) (emphases added). 
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This apparently unwitting embrace of the sort of paternalism it was striking against is an 
example of how, as is often the case when seemingly obvious notions are taken for granted 
without being thoroughly explained and justified, the Court did not consistently apply its own 
theories. Over the course of the six cases, the Court mixed-and-matched concerns for individual 
rights to a fair and equally-weighted vote, and society’s interest in preserving popular 
sovereignty. For example, in Lucas, the Court rejected an amendment to the Colorado 
Constitution that provided for representation that was insufficiently population-based, even 
though that amendment had been approved by a majority of voters statewide and a majority of 
voters in every county.47 Moreover, as subsequent experience has demonstrated, it is entirely 
possible to draw up districts that contain equal numbers of individuals, but do not 
proportionately represent the varying political tastes and inclinations of the populace.48 As 
Justice Stewart noted, 
[t]he very fact of geographic districting, the constitutional validity of which the 
Court does not question, carries with it an acceptance of the idea of legislative 
representation of regional needs and interests. Yet if geographical residence is 
irrelevant, as the Court suggests, and the goal is solely that of equally ‘weighted’ 
votes, I do not understand why the Court’s constitutional rule does not require the 
abolition of districts and the holding of all elections at large.49 
 
Nevertheless, the point is this: the Court seemed to accept pluralism, or pluralistic assumptions 
about governance, in deciding these reapportionment cases. It was suspicious of a paternalistic 
                                                 
47 Lucas, 377 U.S. at 731 (“[A] majority of the voters in every county of the State voted in favor of the 
apportionment scheme embodied in Amendment No. 7's provisions, in preference to that contained in proposed 
Amendment No. 8, which, subject to minor deviations, would have based the apportionment of seats in both houses 
on a population basis.”). 
48 This is sometimes disparagingly called “gerrymandering.” 
49 Lucas, 377 U.S. at 750 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Imagine the following worst-case scenario: a State with 100 
legislative districts, each with 100,000 residents. Control of 51 districts is needed to control the legislature. Assume 
that 49 of the districts consist exclusively of some hypothetical A Party; this accounts for 4,900,000 of the State’s 
10,000,000 people. Assume that the other 51 districts each have 50,001 B Party residents, and 49,999 A Party 
residents. Assuming everyone votes for their party preference, the B Party will win in those 51 districts and control 
the Legislature. However, the B Party has only 2,550,051 out of 10,000,000 voters, or 25.5% of the electorate. 
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attitude that thinks there are “right” answers to society’s problems, and that considered 
deliberation can persuade factions to arrive at that answer. The Court may even have been 
rightfully suspicious; decades of white efforts at using the mechanics of representation and 
elections to reduce blacks to political pariahs would probably tend to make the Court suspicious 
of arguments that rural areas that just so happen to be predominantly white deserve to have their 
legislative voice amplified vis-à-vis cities which just so happen to be predominantly black.  
III. Justice Stewart’s Cryptic Votes: What Does the Pattern Mean? 
Justice Stewart’s dissent, attached to the Lucas opinion, applied only in that case and in 
WMCA. He filed four other cryptic opinions, each of which stated that he voted as he did due to 
the reasons expressed in the aforementioned dissent, even though that dissent didn’t actually 
discuss the other four situations specifically. Although the lack of extended explication makes it 
less than completely clear what Justice Stewart’s vote was after only a superficial examination of 
his opinion in each of the four cases, analysis indicates that he voted with the majority in 
Reynolds, Davis, and Roman, and dissented in Tawes. It seems clear enough that Justice Stewart 
was occupying some sort of middle ground between the majority, which intended to demand a 
uniform rule of population equality, and Justice Harlan, who seemed to prefer total judicial 
abdication of resolving these sorts of disputes. But what was the nature of that middle ground? 
Before proceeding, it would be helpful at this time to reproduce a representative sample 
of Justice Stewart’s brief comments in these other four cases: 
MR. JUSTICE STEWART. 
 
In this case the appellees showed that the apportionment of seats among the 
districts represented in the Delaware House of Representatives and within the 
counties represented in the Delaware Senate, apparently reflects “no policy, but 
simply arbitrary and capricious action.” The appellants have failed to dispel this 
showing by suggesting any possible rational explanation for these aspects of 
Delaware’s system of legislative apportionment. Accordingly, for the reasons 
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stated in my dissenting opinion in Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly of 
Colorado, post, p. 744, I would affirm the judgment of the District Court insofar 
as it holds that Delaware’s system of apportionment violates the Equal Protection 
Clause.50 
 
Similar comments appeared under Justice Stewart’s name in Reynolds, Tawes, and Davis. 
Contrary to the suggestion of the text, Justice Stewart’s dissenting opinion in Lucas did not 
“state” his reasons for voting as he did in Reynolds, Tawes, Davis, or Roman. We are left to our 
own devices to determine the distinction he discerned between the cases. He apparently saw a 
difference between them discerned neither by the majority (which required an across-the-board 
equal population rule) nor Justice Harlan (who advocated no judicial oversight at all). 
It will be easier to see the differences if we first understand what was the same about the 
apportionment methods. In every case, the population disparities that the majority objected to 
were caused, for one reason or another, by an unwillingness to break up counties and combine 
them with parts of other counties in order to create districts with more equal populations. Thus, 
for example, none of the districting schemes employed would have allowed Michigan’s current 
98th House District, which consists of several whole and partial municipalities in Midland 
County, along with several municipalities in Saginaw County.51 On the other hand, they would 
not have uniformly objected to Michigan’s 1st House District, which contains part of the City of 
Detroit and several neighboring municipalities, all located within Wayne County.52 Nor would 
they have uniformly objected to Michigan’s 32nd Senate District, which consists of Saginaw and 
Gratiot Counties (no more and no less).53 
                                                 
50 Roman, 377 U.S. at 712 (Stewart, J.). 
51 See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 4.2001 (West 2004). 
52 Id. 
53 Id. § 4.2002. 
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It is, perhaps, best to start the search for differences with the most notorious of the cases 
decided by the Court in this batch: Reynolds. In that case, the Alabama Legislature had ignored 
the mandate of the Alabama Constitution to reapportion itself after the decennial census, and 
instead continued to utilize the provisional apportionment provided for in the Alabama 
Constitution since its ratification in 1901.54 Although the Alabama Constitution had elaborate 
provisions about how seats were to be awarded, allowing counties to be combined into districts 
but only as whole units (for the Senate) and distributing House seats such that each county got at 
least 1 seat, they hadn’t actually been put into practice; the Legislature simply didn’t reapportion 
the seats amongst the counties in the intervening 60 years, making the contemporary 
apportionment seem apparently arbitrary.55 
Two of the other cases presented apportionments that were similarly arbitrary, albeit for 
different reasons. In Delaware (Roman), each of Delaware’s 3 counties got identical 
representation in both chambers of its legislature, along with special representation for its 
arguably sui generis metropolitan area (Wilmington), but whatever the merits of this approach, 
the State Constitution specifically described the boundaries of each election district within the 
counties and was apparently arbitrary.56 In Virginia (Davis), the Virginia Constitution provided 
no rules for apportioning seats at all; instead, it simply set a number of seats, and the legislature 
drew up an ad hoc election map that took as indivisible units the State’s counties and 
independent cities, and combined them in various election districts and overlay (or, “floterial”) 
                                                 
54 The plaintiffs in Reynolds noted that “the Alabama Legislature had established a pattern of prolonged inaction 
from 1911[, the Alabama Legislature’s first opportunity to reapportion after the taking of the 1910 Census, the first 
census subsequent to the Alabama Constitution’s ratification in 1901,] to the present[, 1964,] which ‘clearly 
demonstrates that no reapportionment . . . shall be effected.’” Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 540. 
55 See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 540–41 (citing Ex parte Rice, 143 So. 2d 848 (Ala. 1962); Opinion of the Justices, 81 
So. 2d 881, 887 (Ala. 1955); Waid v. Pool, 51 So. 2d 869, 870 (Ala. 1951); Opinion of the Justices, 47 So. 2d 714, 
717 (Ala. 1950)). 
56 Roman, 377 U.S. at 704. 
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election districts to mete out the seats.57 Obviously, relatively substantial population differences 
existed between the majority’s perception of the “voting strength” of different blocs of voters.58 
Conversely, in New York/WMCA, Inc. and Colorado/Lucas, the State Constitutions set 
out formulas for apportioning seats (unlike in Virginia/Davis) amongst established political 
subdivisions (unlike in Delaware/Roman), and that formula was being followed (unlike in 
Alabama/Reynolds). Granted, the formulas tended to disfavor urban areas. For example, the New 
York scheme was an extremely complicated effort to prevent New York City from gaining a 
larger share of the seats in the State Senate as its population increased, by increasing the size of 
the body to accommodate population growth in the City instead of allocating increasing numbers 
of seats to it in a zero-sum fashion.59 Nevertheless, they were formulaic. Moreover, in New 
York, the voters had recently defeated a ballot proposal calling for a constitutional convention to 
address the issue of perceived malapportionment,60 while the voters of Colorado had recently 
                                                 
57 Davis, 377 U.S. at 685–86 & n.2. For example, “the City of Lynchburg, with a . . . population of 54,790, [was] 
itself allocated one seat in the Virginia House of Delegates . . . . Amherst County, with a population of only 22,953, 
[was] not given any independent representation in the Virginia House. But the City of Lynchburg and Amherst 
County [were] combined in a floterial district with a total population of 77,743. Presumably, it was felt that 
Lynchburg was entitled to some additional representation in the Virginia House, since its population significantly 
exceeded the ideal House district size of 36,669. However, since Lynchburg’s population did not approach twice 
that figure, it was apparently decided that Lynchburg was not entitled, by itself, to an added seat. Adjacent Amherst 
County, with a population substantially smaller than the ideal district size, was presumably felt not to be entitled to a 
separate House seat. The solution was the creation of a floterial district comprising the two political subdivisions, 
thereby according Lynchburg additional representation and giving Amherst County a voice in the Virginia House, 
without having to create separate additional districts for each of the two political subdivisions.” Id. at 686 n.2. 
58 Davis, 377 U.S. at 688–89. 
59 For more information on this complex and fascinating apportionment scheme, see Ruth C. Silva, Apportionment 
in New York, 30 FORDHAM L. REV. 581 (1962), and Ruth C. Silva, Apportionment of the New York Assembly, 31 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1962). 
60 See WMCA, Inc., 377 U.S. at 638 (“[New York] voters had twice disapproved proposals for a constitutional 
convention to amend the constitutional provisions relating to legislative apportionment . . . . [T]he 1957 vote on 
whether to call a constitutional convention was ‘heralded as an issue of apportionment’ by the then Governor, but . . 
. nevertheless a majority of the State's voters chose not to have a constitutional convention convened.”); CALVIN B. 
T. LEE, ONE MAN, ONE VOTE 5 (1967) (“An attempt to bring about change by constitutional convention failed in 
1957. Although the state constitution allows the voters to decide every twenty years whether a convention should be 
held to consider constitutional changes, half of the voters in 1957 did not even vote on the question. Of those who 
did, 48% favored a convention and 52% did not; 1977 would be the next opportunity to again bring up the issue.”). 
The next sentence is, perhaps, telling of the echo chamber that Mr. Lee and the Reynolds majority lives in: “Thus 
[reapportionment proponents] w[ere] left with only the alternative of going to the courts.” Id. (emphasis added). 
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approved the apportionment scheme struck down in Lucas in a referendum.61 In short, the 
systems seemed to be “working.” 
Unsurprisingly, given the middle-of-the-road approach Justice Stewart was pursuing, he 
reserved his most subtle vote for Tawes, the most difficult of the cases. In Tawes, the Maryland 
Constitution specifically prescribed the number of seats each County received in the State House, 
as well as the City of Baltimore.62 In the Senate, each County got the same representation (1 
seat), while Baltimore got 6 seats.63 Given Stewart’s apparent antipathy toward the “permanent 
provisional” apportionment in Reynolds, it is difficult to argue that he would have supported a 
similar result in the Maryland House simply because it was not a provisional apportionment, but 
instead a permanent “crazy quilt.” On the other hand, the Maryland Senate presents more 
difficult issues. In Maryland, Baltimore’s size and importance arguably make it sui generis like 
Wilmington was in Roman.64 On the other hand, the line between being sui generis and simply 
preferred for superior treatment is blurry. Thus, it is perhaps no surprise that Stewart voted not 
with the majority to invalidate Maryland’s apportionment, nor with Harlan’s dissent professing 
no judicial role in assessing it. Instead, he voted to remand the case to the Maryland Court of 
Appeals for more factfinding as to whether the scheme was arbitrary or capricious.65 
                                                 
61 Lucas, 377 U.S. at 731 (“[A] majority of the voters in every county of the State voted in favor of the 
apportionment scheme embodied in Amendment No. 7's provisions, in preference to that contained in proposed 
Amendment No. 8, which, subject to minor deviations, would have based the apportionment of seats in both houses 
on a population basis.”). 
62 Tawes, 377 U.S. at 665–66. 
63 Id. at 664. 
64 Note that Stewart was able to avoid reaching this tricky issue in Roman, apparently because the specific 
description of each election district in each county adhered to no apparent theory of representational structures. 
65 Id. at 676–77 (Stewart, J.) (“In this case there is no finding by this Court or by the Maryland Court of Appeals that 
Maryland's apportionment plan reflects ‘no policy, but simply arbitrary and capricious action or inaction.’ Nor do I 
think such a finding on the record before us would be warranted. Consequently, . . . I would affirm the judgment of 
the Maryland Court of Appeals unless the Maryland apportionment ‘could be shown systematically to prevent 
ultimate effective majority rule.’ The Maryland court did not address itself to this question. Accordingly, I would 




The implicit message of Justice Stewart’s votes is that the Court ought to remain neutral 
as between theories of political organization, but ought to insist that some theory be in place. 
Indeed, although his dissent has a decidedly republican flavor,66 the actual pattern of his votes 
suggests that he was simply concerned that representational structures be principled. Justice 
Harlan’s basically absolutist position that apportionment is not an area that the Court can 
properly adjudicate would, for example, have left the State of Alabama free to leave its decades-
old provisional apportionment in place long after the facts upon which it was based in 1901 had 
changed. The majority’s position essentially constitutionalized a rule of pluralistic political 
organization, on the commonly-held assumption that the legislature should be an accurate cross-
section of the actual distribution of opinions and perspectives. As between those two approaches, 
it would seem only Justice Stewart was standing for the notion that States ought to be able to 
adopt approaches that attempt to bring all perspectives to the table (and, in the process, 
amplifying some of them more than their share of the population would indicate) in order to 
consensually arrive at a socially-maximizing outcome, without precluding them from preferring 
a pluralistic alternative should they so desire. 
IV. Why Does Justice Stewart’s Voting Pattern Matter? 
The slimmest majority in these six cases was the 6–3 majorities in WMCA and Lucas. As 
a result, it cannot be argued that a proper understanding of Justice Stewart is a forgotten “tipping 
point” of understanding these cases; even without his vote, Chief Justice Warren’s pluralistic 
opinion would have commanded a majority. There are, however, good reasons to study the 
                                                 
66 See, e.g., Lucas, 377 U.S. at 749, 751 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“[L]egislative apportionment . . . should ideally be 
designed to insure effective representation . . . of the various groups and interests making up the electorate. . . . 
[Population] must often to some degree be subordinated in devising a legislative apportionment plan which is to 
achieve the important goal of ensuring a fair, effective, and balanced representation of the regional, social, and 
economic interests within a State. . . . [S]o long as a State’s apportionment plan reasonably achieves, in the light of 
the State’s own characteristics, effective and balanced representation of all substantial interests, without sacrificing 
the principle of effective majority rule, that plan cannot be considered irrational.”) (emphases added). 
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distinction. It is easy to see Justice Harlan as the standard-bearer for the opposition to the 
majority in Reynolds, but if forced to choose between his vision of judicial abdication of 
apportionment oversight, and the majority’s equal population rule, even many judicial 
conservatives might side with the majority. Justice Stewart offers a helpful “third way” to assess 
apportionment issues. That the current equipopulation rule seems inextricably entrenched may 
have as much to do with the logistical problems with challenging it as anything else.67 
There are at least two reasons why recognizing Justice Stewart’s unique position in these 
reapportionment cases is valuable. First, there is reason to believe that American society has lost 
its interest in and commitment to sub-national levels of government. The reapportionment cases 
may have had something to do with this: since it is virtually impossible to provide representation 
by political sub-unit, Americans may have made the rational decision to pay less attention to 
levels of government that offer them little to identify with. Additionally, from a doctrinal point 
of view, there is reason to believe that contemporary constitutional law casebooks mis-construe 
Justice Stewart’s position in these cases. In doing so, they mask the issues at play in these cases 
and fail to prompt students to think more critically about this area of Equal Protection doctrine. 
A. American Interest in Local Affairs May Have Waned 
I consider it uncontroversial to assert that Americans pay little heed to sub-national 
political matters. In part, this is probably because many sub-national units of government can 
seem interchangeable. In my own corner of the world, I cannot say with certainty which of 
several possible municipalities I live within, and there are relatively few reasons to go to the 
trouble to find out with greater certainty. Although there are legitimate reasons for this 
                                                 
67 It seems apparent that the only way to effectively challenge the equipopulation principle would be for a State to 
enact a new Constitution (or, constitutional amendment) that would depart from the equipopulation rule and provoke 
a challenge, generating an opportunity for the Court to reconsider the rule. It seems equally apparent that this issue is 
not something that provokes sufficient public passion for a State to embark on such an experiment. 
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indifference, at the same time, it is the smaller, local units of government that decide to do things 
like pave roads, make traffic stops, regulate land use, and put on most criminal trials. It is at least 
arguable that the incentives are in place for every voter to be passionately interested in their local 
government as that which provides the most-used services. 
Arguably, Americans once did identify more with local government than they do now. 
Although not a scientific study by today’s standards, it hardly needs substantiating that Alexis de 
Tocqueville’s Democracy in America is a widely respected collection of insights into what 
American society was like in the bygone early 19th century. On the strength of certain of his 
observations that were uniquely prescient, such as that Russia and the United States “seem[] 
called by some secret design of Providence one day to hold in [each of their] hands the destinies 
of half the world,”68 Tocqueville is a staple of political science education in the United States. 
Often, Tocqueville describes an America, particularly a series of American attitudes 
about local affairs, that seems jarringly inconsistent with contemporary attitudes. His baseline 
model was the New England township. “The New Englander is attached to his township not so 
much because he was born there as because he sees his township as a free, strong corporation of 
which he is part and which is worth the trouble of trying to direct.”69 New Englanders, in 
Tocqueville’s view, were so passionate about their townships that the township “form[s] the 
nucleus of strong attachments, and there is meanwhile no rival center close by to attract the hot 
hearts of ambitious men.”70 “No ambitious man” would make the pursuit of high federal office 
“the fixed aim of his endeavors” when “[i]t is in the township, the center of the ordinary business 
                                                 
68 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 413 (J.P. Mayer ed., George Lawrence trans., Perennial 
Classics 2000). 
69 Id. at 68. 
70 Id. at 69. 
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of life, that the desire for esteem, the pursuit of substantial interests, and the taste for power and 
self-advertisement are concentrated.”71 It is fair to say that the “money quote” might be this one: 
The New Englander is attached to his township because it is strong and 
independent; he has an interest in it because he shares in its management; he loves 
it because he has no reason to complain of his lot; he invests his ambition and his 
future in it; in the restricted sphere within his scope, he learns to rule society; he 
gets to know those formalities without which freedom can advance only through 
revolutions, and becoming imbued with their spirit, develops a taste for order, 
understands the harmony of powers, and in the end accumulates clear, practical 
ideas about the nature of his duties and the extent of his rights.72 
 
It goes without saying that this may sound appealingly poetic, but it does not match the 
attitude many people have about townships. Tocqueville recognized that, however; he knew that 
New England townships were a special beast. No, “the farther one goes from New England, the 
more the county tends to take the place of the township in communal life.”73 The county is so 
influential that it “becomes the great administrative center and the intermediary between the 
government and the plain citizen.”74 It takes the place of the township as the “[l]ocal institution[] 
[which is] to liberty what primary schools are to science; they put it within the people’s reach; 
they teach people to appreciate its peaceful enjoyment and accustom them to make use of it.”75 
Indeed, municipalities are so important that, “[w]ithout local institutions a nation may give itself 
a free government, but it has not got the spirit of liberty.”76 
Tocqueville thought local institutions were important in and of themselves, irrespective 
of the number of people that lived there. The Supreme Court in the reapportionment cases 
disagreed. The county-based apportionments the Court struck down appeared to it “often to be 
                                                 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 70 (emphases added). 
73 Id. at 81 (emphasis added). 
74 Id. 




little more than an after-the-fact rationalization offered in defense of maladjusted state 
apportionment arrangements.”77 Could the Supreme Court’s skepticism of the validity of county-
based apportionments have anything to do with our atrophied sense of importance of local 
government today? It is hard to demonstrate that with any certainty. On the other hand, there is 
little reason to think that Justice Harlan’s argument in favor of (essentially) total judicial 
disregard for overseeing apportionment methods would have done anything more to inculcate 
affinity for local government. But Justice Stewart’s forgotten middle position may have provided 
a way for the States to “push” their citizens to care more about local government. Being trapped 
between inaction or equal population left no room for schemes such as the Board of Supervisors 
that was originally to govern counties in Michigan,78 when the Supreme Court held that county 
governance bodies also must be apportioned on a “one-man, one-vote” basis.79 
 B. Casebooks Consistently Paper Over Justice Stewart’s Position 
When one stops to think about it, it really is quite surprising how many casebooks exist 
on topics as complex as constitutional law. Consider how daunting the task would be to start 
writing a new casebook on any topic, let alone one analyzed so exhaustively. Then consider the 
pressure to provide a unique service, to make a casebook that is better or offers something that 
competitors do not. It is a process that this article does not intend to suggest any real knowledge 
or expertise concerning; it is beyond this project. 
                                                 
77 Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 573. 
78 MICH. CONST. art. VII, § 7 (“A board of supervisors shall be established in each organized county consisting of 
one member from each organized township and such representation from cities as provided by law.”), held 
unconstitutional by In re Advisory Opinion, 158 N.W.2d 497 (Mich. 1968) (per curiam). 
79 Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968). 
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For the purposes of this article, I surveyed seven leading casebooks on constitutional 
law80 and their treatment of Reynolds and its companion cases. Of course, not every group of 
casebook authors will choose to emphasize the same matters equally; for some topics, it may be 
enough to fill in readers on what the “rule” is in an area of jurisprudence instead of extensively 
fleshing out the history and development of the doctrine. The choice of what texts to emphasize 
is the product of the particular expertise of the respective casebook authors81 and beyond the 
scope of this article, and there is no intention to second guess those decisions here. As a result, 
those casebooks that chose not to make Reynolds a principal case are outside this analysis,82 as 
well as the book that excerpted the majority opinion in Reynolds, but offered no comparison or 
analysis of it with any of the other opinions discussed in this article.83 
To the extent that a casebook does excerpt a case, however, it is fair to say that the 
consideration of the case ought to be complete and not misleading. If a casebook author 
considers Reynolds to be sufficiently important to excerpt it at length, as well as the Harlan and 
Stewart dissenting opinions filed with it, then presumably that author should be complete in his 
or her presentation of the case. And yet, as the preceding discussion indicates, at least Justice 
Stewart’s pattern of votes in the collected cases appears to have been relatively fact-specific. A 
                                                 
80 JEROME A. BARRON, C. THOMAS DIENES, WAYNE MCCORMACK & MARTIN H. REDISH, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
(7th ed. 2006); PAUL BREST, SANFORD LEVINSON, JACK M. BALKIN, AKHIL REED AMAR & REVA B. SIEGEL, 
PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING (5th ed. 2006); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
(2d ed. 2005); JESSE H. CHOPER, RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., YALE KAMISAR & STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (10th ed. 2006); WILLIAM COHEN, JONATHAN D. VARAT & VIKRAM AMAR, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (12th ed. 2005); GEOFFREY R. STONE, LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, CASS R. SUNSTEIN, MARK 
V. TUSHNET & PAMELA S. KARLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (5th ed. 2005); KATHLEEN SULLIVAN & GERALD 
GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (16th ed. 2007). 
81 See, e.g., COHEN ET AL., supra note 80, at vi n.1 (“[W]e view the selection, sequencing and editing of cases . . . as 
a primary service we provide in the book . . . .”). 
82 See BARRON ET AL., supra note 80, at 912–13; BREST ET AL., supra note 79, at 916, 1155. 
83 See COHEN ET AL., supra note 80, at 937–43. Arguably, this is akin to the comments about the casebooks that 
offered incomplete or misleading characterizations of the other opinions, but it is also analogous to the casebooks 
that briefly state the equipopulation rule of Reynolds and quote a few paragraphs of the Court’s logic. Ultimately, 




careful consideration of what Justice Stewart was dissenting against and what he accepted would 
seemingly need to delve into those factual distinctions. While it is perhaps unsurprising that 
casebook authors do not choose to spend the space necessary to delve into this, at the same time 
it is notable that they uniformly do not. 
Generally speaking, the flaw in the casebook coverage comes from an effort at editing 
down the case such that Justice Stewart’s dissent (filed in Lucas but also applying to WMCA) can 
be contrasted with the majority opinion in Reynolds. While it is true that the logic Justice Stewart 
used in his dissent sparred with the majority’s logic in Reynolds, the simple fact of the matter is 
that he did not dissent in Reynolds! This has the potential to lead to confusion, or at least a failure 
to recognize the real meaning of Justice Stewart’s “third way” approach. 
For example, in one casebook, the introduction to the section on vote dilution and 
Reynolds notes that “[Reynolds] arose from a challenge to the malapportionment of the Alabama 
legislature. The challengers claimed that the existing districting scheme, based on the 1900 
census, discriminated against voters in counties whose populations had grown proportionately far 
more than others since the 1900 census.”84 A brief bracketed comment after the majority opinion 
notes that “the Court relied on [Reynolds’] principles to invalidate apportionment schemes”85 in 
several other States, and that Lucas “warrants special mention . . . because it had been approved 
by the voters of the state by a statewide referendum. Moreover, the voters had rejected a plan to 
apportion both houses on the basis of population.”86 The excerpt contains a single paragraph of 
Stewart’s dissent, noting that it was “in the Colorado and New York cases.”87 
                                                 
84 SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 80, at 643. 
85 Id. at 645. 
86 Id. at 645–46. 
87 Id. at 647. 
27 
 
While the preceding discussion by now hopefully makes one conversant with what was 
actually happening in this series of votes and decisions, is there any doubt that a law student 
would fail to understand what was going on? The text offers no indication of why Stewart was 
dissenting only in New York and Colorado, and Stewart specifically did not dissent against 
striking down the Alabama districting scheme based on the census of 1900! It is impossible to 
understand the true meaning of Justice Stewart’s assertion that an apportionment plan ought to 
achieve “effective and balanced representation of all substantial interests” without some 
consideration of the facts that distinguish the cases. 
Stewart’s position is possibly cast in an even worse light in the Choper casebook. There, 
Reynolds is preceded with a note that recounts the various statistical wrongs that the “permanent 
provisional” apportionment of the Alabama Constitution foisted upon Alabamans.88 Nothing, 
however, notes that Reynolds was part of a package of cases decided that day. Although the 
excerpt of Stewart’s opinion notes that he “concurred in the result in Reynolds, but . . . dissented 
in two of the companion cases in an opinion sharply at odds with the Reynolds rationale,”89 it 
leaves it up to the reader to discover that there were several cases decided that day, with separate 
majority opinions, and differing facts which produced Stewart’s differing votes. 
Perhaps the most mixed treatment of these cases is in the Stone text. The introduction to 
the majority opinion makes it clear that there were six cases and States, but also quotes the 
majority as saying Alabama, with “no reapportionment of seats in the Alabama Legislature for 
over 60 years,” was “signally illustrative and symptomatic of the seriousness of this problem [of 
                                                 
88 CHOPER ET AL., supra note 80, at 1369 (“Although the Alabama constitution required the legislature to 
reapportion decennially on the basis of population, none had taken place since 1901. . . . [Under] 1960 census 
figures, only 25.1% of the State’s total population resided in districts represented by a majority of the members of 
the Senate, and only 25.7% lived in counties which could elect a majority of the members of the House of 
Representatives. Population-variance ratios of up to about 41-to-1 existed in the Senate, and up to about 16-to-1 in 
the House.”). 
89 Id. at 1372. 
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malapportionment] in a number of States.”90 If this were the reader’s last exposure to these 
matters, they might conclude that all six States had basically refused to reapportion according to 
their own constitutions to preserve a status quo. However, the end of the excerpt from Justice 
Stewart’s opinion does note that he voted to uphold the Colorado and New York apportionments 
because Colorado’s was “adopted in a statewide referendum and because it accommodated the 
distinct interests and characteristics of the state’s various regions,”91 while the New York 
apportionment was acceptable because it “assured smaller counties greater representation in the 
Assembly than would be warranted under a population-based apportionment and limited 
representation of the largest counties . . . [which] was justified as a counterweight to New York 
City’s ‘concentration of population, homogeneity of interest, and political cohesiveness.’”92 
A similarly novel approach to dealing with these cases is in the Chemerinsky text. There, 
Chemerinsky includes Reynolds as a principal case and thus excerpts at a few pages’ length the 
majority opinion.93 He also includes Justice Harlan’s dissent, which dissented equally to all six 
of the reapportionment cases.94 However, he does not include anything at all from Justice 
Stewart’s dissent, and thus there is no opportunity for a mischaracterization of Justice Stewart’s 
position. This is both good and bad: while Justice Stewart’s position is thus not mis-represented, 
arguably this arrangement misses an opportunity for a “teachable moment” to instruct students 
on the range of options that were available to the Court at the time it decided these cases. 
However, given the constraints of a survey course on constitutional law, it is arguable (and, 
                                                 
90 STONE ET AL., supra note 80, at 782. 
91 Id. at 785. 
92 Id. at 786. 
93 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 80, at 953–56 
94 Id. at 956–57. 
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given his pedigree, unsurprising) that Chemerinsky gives both the most complete and least 
misleading account of the reapportionment cases by simply omitting Stewart entirely. 
As noted earlier, this discussion does not purport to be a substantive evaluation of 
whether Reynolds ought to be taught and, if so, how it should be taught. That said, the diversity 
of approaches to the case indicate that, in the opinion of at least some casebook authors, it is a 
sufficiently significant piece of case law that it ought to be included as a principal case that 
students should spend some time reflecting on (as opposed to simply introducing them to the 
case’s equipopulation rule). And yet, as this discussion should indicate, Justice Stewart’s 
position in Reynolds was nuanced and subtle; his dissent, which is often printed opposite the 
majority opinion in Reynolds, did not even apply to Reynolds. Although Justice Stewart’s “third 
way” position in Reynolds may be difficult to teach, it is notable that in some other 
circumstances, similarly subtle “third way” distinctions are, if not emphasized, at least not 
glossed over.95 At any rate, it is possible that greater emphasis on Stewart’s alternative approach 
could drive interest in this area of constitutional law for a new generation of lawyers. 
V. Conclusions 
Apportionment and districting schemes are an important way in which a society 
expresses how it wants to look. “The apportionment of seats in a legislature is the apportionment 
of power within the community. Any scheme of legislative apportionment represents choices 
regarding how much power shall be allocated to the diverse interests within the society.”96 A 
                                                 
95 See, e.g., COHEN, supra note 80, at 107–110, 111–112 (excerpting from Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 
(1993), Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion holding that the issue of the sufficiency of a Senate impeachment trial 
of a U.S. District Court judge was nonjusticiable; Justice White’s opinion, concurring in the judgment, that it was 
justiciable, and Justice Souter’s “third way” approach that normally it would be nonjusticiable but that “[o]ne can, 
nevertheless, envision different and unusual circumstances that might justify a more searching review of 
impeachment proceedings”). 
96 RICHARD C. CORTNER, THE APPORTIONMENT CASES 3 (1970). 
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natural place for that fundamental matter to be expressed is in a Constitution, and, at the federal 
level, there is relatively widespread devotion to the Constitution in some intangible way. 
Yet “State constitutions generally receive little attention in most American law schools, 
or in American life generally.”97 Perhaps this is because the Court has disallowed it; if “[t]he 
theory of equal population apportionment . . . competed with other theories that rejected 
population as the only legitimate basis of representation,”98 and the Court simply undid the 
political compromises that the various State Constitutions in the reapportionment cases 
represented, why bother paying attention? Indeed, if “one c[an] see little of value left in a state 
constitution that could not be handled in statutory law,”99 it is quite rational that the average 
voter cares not for his or her State Constitution, or local units of government; much of what 
makes them worth being interested in has washed away. It seems likely that, if the ramifications 
of the reapportionment cases had been framed in exactly this way, most people would have at 
least asked for more time to think it over carefully before making a decision, instead of glibly 
throwing out years of careful deliberation and political haggling.100 Perhaps Justice Stewart’s 
                                                 
97 RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 47 
(6th ed. 2004) (citing U.S. ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM 7 (1989) for the proposition that “only 44% of Americans know that their state has its own 
constitution”). 
98 CORTNER, supra note 95, at 4. 
99 See GRAHAM, supra p. 13. 
100 CORTNER, supra note 95, at 3–4 (“The compromise on legislative apportionment in the Philadelphia 
[Constiutional] convention demonstrated that while the theory of equal population apportionment was supported 
widely in the United States, its implementation in apportionment systems was subject to being tempered by 
consideration of other factors as legitimate, and competing, basis of representation—such as representation of 
political subdivisions and economic interests. Indeed, during the first half of the twentieth century, the number of 
American state legislatures apportioned on a population basis decreased steadily. With the rise of the city, 
legislatures became more and more reluctant to accord representation to these new concentrations of population 
commensurate with their numbers. While failure to reapportion contributed greatly to the decline of equal 
population representation in state legislatures, further barriers to such equality were imposed in many states by 
constitutional provisions that recognized factors other than population in determining the bases of representation. A 
survey of the apportionment provisions of state constitutions in 1955 found that population, without qualification, 
was the basis of representation in the upper houses of the legislatures of only twenty-two states and the lower houses 




approach would have been the moderate position they would have chosen. Hopefully, future 
generations of lawyers can be exposed to his quiet, overlooked wisdom. 
